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When life hands you Lemons, use them: The Establishment Clause in the 21st Century as Applied
to Legislative-Led Prayer
I. Introduction
Imagine you have recently moved to a new town. You have a list of board requests to make at the
next local board meeting and to ensure you make a positive impression, you arrive early and personally
introduce yourself to each member. The board meeting is about to start, when one of the board members
instructs you to stand for prayer. As a self-professed pagan, being forced to worship Jesus Christ is
bothersome. You are at a crossroad: do you remain seated and jeopardize your chances of being granted
permission from the board for your requests or do you reluctantly stand in order to seek a favorable
ruling? The cases explored throughout this note will illustrate this scenario in greater detail, and
demonstrate how legislative regulation of prayer is unconstitutional.
There is a long history of chaplain-led prayer that Courts have found to be consistent with the
Establishment Clause.1 Courts have even gone so far as to hold that open invitation to local clergy, even
if it ends up being predominately Christian, is consistent with the Establishment Clause.2 Now,
however, a new practice has arisen: the legislators themselves offering the prayers.3 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuits have issued conflicting opinions interpreting the constitutionality of legislative-led prayers,
creating a spirited circuit split.4

1

See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785, 793-95 (1983).
See also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813 (2014)(holding that clergy led prayer
which is mostly Christian is consistent with the Establishment Clause, as long as the practice is
neither discriminatory or coercive in nature).
3 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of
Jackson, 870 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2017).
4 Id.
2

The Establishment Clause (“the Clause”) protects individuals who are unwilling to conform to
legislative-led prayers.5 For years, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been in
disarray.6 As such, and unsurprisingly, circuit court judges are divided, on the constitutionality of the
issue related to which standard applies to the review of cases challenging the Clause.7 Recently, the
Fourth Circuit ruled en banc that legislative-led prayers violate the Establishment Clause, asserting that
the constitutionality of this issue has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.8
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit diverted, also en banc, and found instead that legislative-led prayer was
indeed constitutional, based upon a “historical analysis.”9 The constitutionality of legislative-led prayer
is uncertain until the Supreme Court speaks.10
This note will explore the Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the considerable impact history
has had on legislative-led prayer. Section II will discuss the various approaches to the Establishment
Clause.11 Section III will recount the history of the Clause in the United States and examine the Supreme
Court of the United States position on legislative prayer cases.12 Section IV will analyze the current split
in authority between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in regards to the legislators themselves offering the

Robert Destro, The Court after Scalia: “An establishment of religion”, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 12,
2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-an-establishment-ofreligion/.
6
See supra note 3.
7
Id.
8
Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017).
9
Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, No. 15-1869, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17174, at *3 (6th Cir. Sep. 6,
2017). Art.
10
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/2017/07/18/full-4th-circuit-invalidates-legislator-led-prayercould-lead-to-supreme-court-review/
11
These tests include the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); the endorsement
test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); the coercion test, Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and the “historical analysis”, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785
(1983).
12
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813
(2014).
5

prayers’.13 Finally, Section V will use the facts of both circuit court cases to contend that legislative-led
prayers are impermissible under the Establishment Clause.14
II.

Establishment Clause Approaches
The judiciary’s primary role is to protect rights guaranteed under the Constitution.15 The First

Amendment provides that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”16 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Establishment Clause
applies to both the States and to the Federal Government.17 The judiciary’s role is to protect the
aforementioned rights guaranteed under the Constitution.18 Historically, the courts have understood the
importance of separation between religion and state,19 and have held that “religion is a private matter for
the individual, the family, and the institution of private choice.”20 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court held
that the Establishment Clause is designed to protect against three main evils: “(1) sponsorship; (2)
financial support; and (3) active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”21 In order for a law
to comply with the Establishment Clause, it must “(1) have secular legislative purpose; (2) the principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the policy must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”22 It is important to note that the Supreme
Court recognized how unrealistic it is for complete separation between church and state,23 and thus

13

See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of
Jackson, 870 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2017).
14
Id.
15 U.S. CONST. art. III.
16
U.S. Const. amend. I.
17
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
18
U.S. Const. art. III.
19
Everson, 330 U.S. 1. “Neither a state or the federal government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organization and vice versa” Id. at 16
20
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
21
Id. at 612-13.
22
Id. at 612.
23
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 614 (1971).

implied that there are instances where a “relationship between government and religious organizations” is
considered both permissible and required contact.24 Specifically, zoning regulations, fire inspections, and
compulsory school-attendance are unavoidable and permissible.25 Despite the fact that total separation
between church and state is unrealistic in many contexts, it is possible and practical in the legislative
setting.26 Each of the aforementioned permissive contacts between government and religious
organizations involve a situation where the government’s objective is to further ensure the safety and
overall wellbeing of society. Dissimilarly, legislative-led prayer does not call for such action.27
While the Lemon test continues to be used in many contexts, other tests have emerged, including
the Endorsement and Coercion tests.28 The Endorsement test was used in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
where the Court considered whether holiday displays on public property were constitutional.29 Under
this test, the Establishment Clause is violated when a reasonable observer would infer that the
government “endorses religion.”30 The test ensures that government action does not convey the
“message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.”31 This is a mere modification of Lemon’s purpose and effects prongs. The purpose prong
asks whether the government’s legitimate intention’s is to endorse or reject religion.32 On the other hand,
the effects prong asks whether a “reasonable observer” would infer the government’s act as endorsement

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017).
28 The endorsement test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); the
coercion test, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
29
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (1989).
30
Id.
31 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
32 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 619.
25

or rejection of their particular religious belief.33 The majority applied the endorsement test to determine
that a religious symbol placed prominently in a government building violated the Establishment Clause,
while a religious symbol surrounded by secular symbols and civic signs did not.34 For the first time, a
majority of the Court chose the language of the endorsement test as a new way to analyze Establishment
Clause quandaries.35
In Justice Kennedy’s dissent, he proposed a second alternative to the Lemon test, focusing
solely on the effects prong.36 He concentrated on coercion, both direct and indirect, contending that the
government may not coerce citizens to take part in or support “any religion or its exercise.”37 Although
the majority refused to agree with his line of reasoning, this “coercion” test has been used on occasion to
decide the constitutionality of Establishment Clause violations in later cases before the Court.38
III.

Jurisprudence of Legislative Prayer
The Court has on two occasions addressed the issue of prayers given at the start of a legislative

session: by a chaplain and by invited members of local clergy.39 In its first case, Marsh v. Chambers, a
member of the Nebraska Legislature sued in federal court asserting that prayers offered by a stateselected and state-funded chaplain before a legislative session, violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.40 Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit Court applied the three-prong Lemon
test, holding that state employment of a paid Presbyterian minister violated the Constitution.41 The

33

Id.
Id. at 579.
35
Id. at 589.
36
Id. at 658. (Kennedy, A., dissenting).
37
Id.
38
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 587 (1992).
39 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813
(2014).
40
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983).
41
Id. at 785-86. (Citing Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982)).
34

district court did not find that a paid chaplain offering nonsectarian prayers was per se
unconstitutional,42 however a “single minister being paid to offer legislative prayer . . . over an extended
period of time” is excessive entanglement which violated the First Amendment.43 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed the lower courts, holding that employment of the paid minister by the
state to open legislative session with the invocation of prayer was constitutional.44
The Court deviated from the Lemon test, which, at the time had been consistently used in Establishment
Clause cases for over a decade, and instead employed a “historical standard” in order to determine
whether there was an Establishment Clause violation.45 When applying the “historical standard,” the
court must identify historical patterns.46 The Court found that prayers given in front of legislature are
historically permissible,47 contending that such a prayer is “deeply embedded in the history and tradition
of this country.”48 The Founding Fathers clearly did not view the practice as violating the Establishment
Clause, as three days after they authorized the appointment of paid chaplains in the First Congress they
adopted the exact language in the Bill of Rights.49 Moreover, the majority determined that the content of
legislative prayer was irrelevant to judges if there is no evidence that the prayers had been “exploited to
proselytize any one, or to disparage any other faith or belief.”50 Since there was no evidence that the
prayers exploited or disparaged one particular faith, the Court thus declined to engage in a fact sensitive
analysis to determine if the content of prayers were unfair. 51

42

Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 235.
Id.
44
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 786-88.
45
Id. at 795.
46 Id.
47
Id.
48
Chambers, 463 U.S. at 786.
49 Id. at 790.
50 Id.
51 Id.
43

The dissent was reluctant to support a ruling based upon unique history, stating courts “should not
rely heavily on the advice of the founding fathers because the message of history often tends to be
ambiguous and not relevant to a society far more heterogeneous than that of the framers.”52 Absent the
long history of legislative prayer by the Founding Fathers, the dissent found that the practice is
unconstitutional.53 Holding that it is a mere assumption that the Framers of the Establishment Clause
would not have permitted an act that they believed to be unconstitutional and in violation of the clause.54
James Madison, who authorized the appointment of paid chaplain’s in the First Congress, later revealed
that he believed this practice to be unconstitutional.55 After Marsh the Court went back to applying the
Lemon test, or tests of endorsement or coercion; but it did not rely on a “historical approach.”56 Since
this ruling, some courts have described Marsh as an outlier.57
Over thirty years later, in 2015, Town of Greece v. Galloway revisited the “historical analysis” of
legislative prayer under Marsh.58 The plaintiffs, represented by Americans United for Separation of
Church and State (“AU”), contended that the legislative prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, by preferring Christian chaplains instead of non-Christian chaplains and by
permitting volunteer chaplain led prayer.59 The town adhered to an “informal method for selecting prayer

52

Id. at 791. (Citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (1963)).
53 Chambers, 463 U.S. 814.
54 Id. at 814-15.
55 Id. at 815; Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY QUARTERLY 534, 558
(1946).
56 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (contending that Marsh was an outlier because of the “extremely
long and unambiguous history” of legislative prayer); Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Marsh is one-of-a-kind[.]”)
57 Id.
58
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1816 (2014).
59
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).

givers, all of whom were unpaid volunteers.”60 The guest clergy were allowed to devise the prayers,
based upon their own religious beliefs.61 All of the participating clergy were Christian, and thus, the
prayers were predominantly Christian.62 The district court dismissed the claim and held the practice to be
constitutional,63 asserting that under Marsh, legislative prayers are not required to be nonsectarian.64 The
Second Circuit reversed, holding the practice to be an impermissible affiliation with Christianity.65
Under the “totality of the circumstances” a reasonable observer would view this practice as the town
being affiliated with a particular religion, Christianity.66
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit.67 In reaffirming Marsh, it held
that prayers offered by volunteer clergy before a legislative session, were constitutional.68 Justice
Kennedy concluded that, “the town of Greece [did] not violate the First Amendment by opening its
meetings with prayers that comport with our tradition and does not coerce participation by nonadherents.”69 Although obligated to preserve a policy of nondiscrimination, the town is not required to
hunt for non-Christian clergy outside of its borders.70 The town did not violate the Constitution simply
because most clergy who offered prayers had a strong affiliation with Christianity.71 The majority of the
court contended that mandating nonsectarian prayer was actually prohibited.72 Instruction of
nonsectarian prayer would force legislators and courts to censor prayer, generating greater government
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Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
Id.
62 Id. at 1819.
63 Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
64
Id. at 219, 241.
65
Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012).
66
Id.
67
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
68
Id.
69 Id. at 1828.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1824.
72 Id. at 1822.
61

entanglement than the town’s current practice.73 Justice Kennedy’s stance on nonsectarian prayer
instructions is consistent with his holding in Lee v. Weisman, where he held the practice to be a means by
which the government impermissibly “directs and controls the content of prayers.”74
Notably, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court considered a public prayer policy at a public high school
graduation ceremony, wherein the principal, a government figure, had invited a clergy member to offer
invocation and prayers.75 The principal advised the clergy member that his prayers must be
nonsectarian.76 Plaintiff sought a “permanent injunction barring petitioners, from inviting the clergy to
deliver invocations . . . at future graduations.”77 The district court applied the Lemon test and found the
public prayer policy violated the Establishment Clause.78 Petitioners subsequently appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.79 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the First Circuits holding.80
The Supreme Court noted that the nonsectarian instruction constituted a means by which the
government impermissibly “directed and controlled the content of prayers.”81 According to Justice
Kennedy, the content of the nonsectarian prayer placed indirect coercive pressure on students to
participate.82 The dissent, on the other hand, raised a compelling argument that attendance was
voluntary, therefore the students were not coerced to attend.83 However, absence from graduation had—

73

Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1822.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 588-89 (1992).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 584.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 585.
80 Weisman, 505 U.S at 586.
81 Id. at 588-89.
82
Id. at 577, 592.
83
Id. at 642.
74

and still has—significant effects on students, leaving them with no “real choice” but to attend.84 While
the factual context of Lee is different from that of legislative prayer, the Supreme Court has explicitly
asserted that government instruction of prayer content is impermissible.85
Furthermore, in Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy found that the town’s prayer practice did not
coerce participation by non-adherents,86 basing his reasoning on the history of legislative prayer.87 A
reasonable observer is familiar with traditions of legislative prayer, and understands the purpose is to
show appreciation towards religion, not for the government to coerce non-adherents.88 Prayer practice is
analyzed as a whole, instead of as within the content of a single prayer.89 Justice Kennedy is not only
used a historical approach in his analysis, but he has also incorporated the elements of the coercion test
and even the endorsement test. The “reasonable observer” language comes from the endorsement test.90
However, Justice Kennedy’s use of this approach suggests that it is not reasonable to think this prayer
practice is coercive, especially since the legislative context with a citizen audience differs from the school
context with impressionable children. Accordingly, an independent constituent feeling offended by a
particular prayer does not violate the Constitution. 91
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion instead focused on the Town of Greece’s violation of the “norm of
religious equality.”92 Although Justice Kagan agreed with the Court’s decision in Marsh, she
differentiated the legislative prayer practices in Marsh from those in Town of Greece.93 First, the

84

Id. at 577, 595.
Id. at 577, 592; https://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/who-said-that-a-simple-questionthat-may-change-the-way-courts-view-legislative-prayer
86 Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1824.
90 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989).
91 Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
92 Id. at 1841. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1842.
85

location where the chaplain-led prayers took place is considerably different.94 Marsh took place at a
congressional session,95 whereas, Town of Greece took place at a local town meeting.96 Second, the
prayers that took place in these two locations have differing audiences.97 In Marsh, the chaplains
directed the prayer only to the elected state representatives, since “members of the public take no part in
the proceedings.”98 Whereas, in Town of Greece, the town meetings included extensive involvement by
citizens, who were there to discuss local affairs with their government.99 Consequently, the prayers being
offered by the Christian chaplains were directed to the public, regardless of their particular religious
beliefs.100 Lastly, the content of the prayers significantly differ. In Marsh, the chaplains removed all
Christian references from the prayers, therefore not advancing one particular faith or belief over
another.101 However, in Town of Greece, the prayers were explicitly Christian for close to a decade, and
the town made no effort to remove the sectarian references from the prayers.102
Justice Kagan asserted how explicit the command of the Establishment Clause is, emphasizing
that, “one religious denomination can not be officially preferred over another one.”103 Justice Kagan also
suggested ways in which the town could have employed religious equality, for example, town council
members could have instructed Christian chaplains to give nonsectarian and generic prayers, or they
could have invited chaplains of minority religious groups to give the prayers.104

94

Id. at 1847.
Id.
96 Id.
97 Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1847.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1848.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Greece, 134 S. Ct at 1843.
104 Id. at 1851.
95

The Supreme Court has established two ways in which legislative prayer is consistent with the
Establishment Clause.105 Legislative prayers are permitted when given by a paid chaplain offering
nonsectarian prayers.106 Also, legislative prayers are permitted when given by various clergy members,
of different faiths, offering sectarian prayers when a neutral selection process has been used.107
IV.

Circuit Split
There are four standard tests the courts regularly apply to determine whether an Establishment

Clause violation exists: the Lemon test, the Endorsement test, the Coercion test and, the “historical
analysis” test.108 The Circuit Courts have been confronted by an area of first impression, prayers led not
by clergy but by government officials themselves.109 These legislative-led prayer practices differ
substantially from previous Supreme Court cases, because invocations are reserved solely for board
members.110 The decisions made in Marsh and Town of Greece did not concern legislative-led prayer,
therefore, they do not resolve whether this particular prayer practice is constitutional.111 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuit have issued conflicting opinions interpreting the constitutionality of legislative-led prayers,
creating a spirited circuit split, in Lund v. Rowan Cty., and Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson.112

105

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1813
(2014).
106 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983).
107 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct at 1842.
108
These tests include the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); the endorsement
test, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); the coercion test, Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); and the “historical analysis”, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785
(1983).
109 See generally Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty.
of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2017).
110 Id.
111 See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 785 (1983); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.
Ct. 1813 (2014).
112 Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 275 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d
525 (6th Cir. 2017).

In Lund v. Rowan Cty., in 2015, residents of Rowan County, North Carolina, filed suit against the
county, alleging claims of Establishment Clause violations.113 Plaintiffs alleged that the County Board of
Commissioner’s delivered sectarian legislative prayers and coerced non-adherents to participate.114 The
board members led predominately Christian prayers on a rotating basis115 and no one other than the
members, were permitted to offer invocations.116 Facing the audience, the members would usually invite
those present to pray with them, and the prayers almost always included Christian doctrinal references. 117
Over ninety-seven percent of the prayers were Christian.118 The district court distinguished this case
from Town of Greece, finding that legislative-led prayer made legislators impermissible supervisors of
prayer and religious speech.119 Legislative-led prayer it argued, leads to “a closed-universe of prayer
givers” discriminating against minority religious groups.120
Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on Town of Greece v. Galloway,
reversing the lower court and holding that legislative-led prayer is a long-standing American tradition.121
The court specifically found that legislative-led prayer was comparable to chaplain-led prayer, since the
Supreme Court had remained silent on such practice.122 The Supreme Court has never specified whether
a speaker’s identity should be required as part of the analysis123 and, therefore, it was unreasonable to
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Lund v. Rowan Cty., 103 F. Supp. 3d 715 (M.D.N.C 2015).
Id.
115 Id. at 716.
116 Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 268, 272.
117
Id.
118 Id. at 273.
119
Supra note 96 at 723.
120 Id.
121 Lund, 837 F.3d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2016).
122 Id. at 418.
123 Id.
114

assert that silence on the issue equates to disapproval of the practice.124 The court also pointed out that
legislative-led prayer is intended for the lawmakers themselves to enjoy, not for the public.125
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that the invocations were not coercive.126 Coercive
invocations occur when legislators seek to sway nonbelievers or censor those who believe differently.127
For example, if the prayers’ nature and purpose was intended to “convert others to that belief” or “belittle
those who believed differently” than the invocations would be coercive and therefore unconstitutional
under Town of Greece.128 However, when examining the prayer practice as a whole, as required by Town
of Greece, no violation of the Constitution exists.129 The court went as far as to hold that “a few remarks
are insufficient to despoil a practice that on the whole reflects and embraces our tradition.”130
On rehearing en banc, however, the full Fourth Circuit reversed and determined that Rowan
County’s practice of legislative-led prayer was repugnant the Establishment Clause.131 The court held
that “Marsh and Town of Greece in no way sought to dictate the outcome of every subsequent case.”132
In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court conceded that they have yet to define the Establishment Clause’s
precise boundaries.133 Since Marsh and Town of Greece were not sought to determine the
constitutionality of legislative-led prayer, the Fourth Circuit must carry out a fact sensitive analysis of the
prayer practice.134

124

Id.
Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d at 420.
126 Id. at 421.
127 Id. at 422.
128
Id
129
Id. at 422; Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1824 (2014).
130
Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d at 422-23.
131
Lund v. Rowan Cty., N.C., 863 F.3D 275 (4th Cir. 2017)
132
Id at 276.
133
Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d at 276; Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
134
Lund, N.C., 863 F.3D 275 at 276.
125

The fact sensitive analysis paid special attention to the identity of the prayer giver.135 Prayer
opportunity was strictly reserved for the Commissioners, which created a “closed universe of prayer
givers.”136 In a five-year span, only “four out of one hundred and forty-three prayers were nonsectarian.”137 Invocations were in accordance to legislator’s specific faiths and the prayers proclaimed
that Christianity was exceptional and superior to other faiths.138 A notable amount of prayers, portrayed
Christianity as “the one and only way to salvation”, which implies that all other faiths are inferior, thus,
coercing participation by non-adherents.139 Additionally, the audience booed a town member, who had
expressed opposition to the Board members’ prayer practices.140
These facts are clearly distinguishable from prior Supreme Court cases. In Marsh and Town of
Greece, expansion of faiths for prayer practices was practical by welcoming clergy of different faiths.141
Here, however, the only form of recourse is to vote for a board member with similar religious views.142
As pointed out in Lemon, “political divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political
process,” and is consequently “one of the principle evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect.”143
In Bormuth v. Cnty. Of Jackson, the Board of Commissioners in Jackson County, Michigan
opened each monthly meeting with legislative-led prayer.144 Each commissioner was afforded a chance
to open session, without the content of prayers being reviewed.145 To refrain from hearing prayers they
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Id. at 279.
Id. at 282.
137
Id. at 283.
138 Id. at 281-82, 284.
139 Id. at 284.
140
Lund, N.C., 863 F.3D 275 at 282.
141 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
142 Lund, N.C., 863 F.3D 275 at 282.
143 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
144 Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 849 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2017).
145 Id. at 289.
136

disagreed with, the Board members refused to allow non-commissioners to offer invocations.146 Plaintiff,
a self-professed pagan attended meetings because he sought appointment to serve on Jackson Counties
Solid Waste Planning Committee.147 While in attendance, a commissioner requested for the public to
“rise and assume a reverent position.”148 Plaintiff was the only member of the public who did not “rise
and bow his head.”149 Feeling excluded, he raised this First Amendment issue during the publiccomment period.150 The Board members were unresponsive to his concerns, and reacted with
“disgust.”151 As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against the County, contending claims of Establishment
Clause violations, advocating for the Lemon test to be applied.152 While his suit was pending, the
Commissioners rejected his application to serve on committee and appointed two other less-qualified
individuals to serve.153 The district court found that legislative-led prayer was consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Marsh and Town of Greece, and therefore did not violate the Establishment
Clause.154 Plaintiff subsequently appealed.155
In its review, the Sixth Circuit found that the Board of Commissioners violated the Establishment
Clause because legislative-led prayer was “outside the tradition of historically tolerated prayers.”156
Also, the Sixth Circuit found that the invocations coerced residents to participate.157 The court
established that the Board’s practice fell outside the tradition of legislative prayer in Marsh and Town of
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Greece,158 and found the most distinguishable factor to be the identity of the prayer giver, contending that
the Courts evaluation of prayer practice may be different if town board members were leading the
prayers.159 As held in Town of Greece, the Sixth Circuit noted that the government is forbidden from
coercing its citizens “to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”160 Moreover, in Town of
Greece, Justice Kennedy asserted, “the analysis may be different if town board members directed the
public to participate in prayers or singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decision
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”161 In Bourmuth, the Sixth
Circuit found all three of the afore-mentioned elements to be satisfied.162 First, the Board instructs the
public to join in prayers at the meetings.163 Second, the Board has unambiguously “singled out
Bourmuth for opprobrium.”164 Lastly, the Plaintiff presented compelling proof that the Board had
“allocated benefits and burdens based on participation in the prayer.”165
When the full circuit heard the case en banc, however, it reversed and found that Jackson
County’s practice of legislative-led prayer was consistent with Marsh and Town of Greece, and did not in
fact violate the Establishment Clause.166 Although the Plaintiff here advocated for the Lemon test to be
applied, the Sixth Circuit held that test was irrelevant and using it would “rewrite thirty-plus years of
Supreme Court Jurisprudence.”167 Instead, the court used a “historical standard” to determine whether
there was an Establishment Clause violation.168 It found that neither Marsh nor Town of Greece
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controlled who the prayer giver was,169 and asserted that, “since the founding of our Republic, Congress,
Legislatures, and many municipal bodies have commenced legislative sessions with prayer.”170
Additionally, the court found that a pattern of coercion against non-adherents is needed, to establish a
constitutional violation.171 Therefore, a challenge based on one prayer, which denigrates nonbelievers, is
permissible.172
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Town of Greece is
controlling within this circuit.173 Although the previous Sixth Circuit found all three elements of Justice
Kennedys coercion test to be satisfied, the Sixth Circuit en banc ultimately held differently.174 First, it
held that a request for members of the “public to assist in prayer by rising and remaining quiet” was not
coercive and therefore constitutional.175 Second, it held that the Commissioners raising their backs to the
Plaintiffs, was constitutionally sound, and “not indicative of a pattern and practice of coercion” towards
non-adherents.176 Lastly, Plaintiff assumed that the County deliberately rejected his application based
upon his pending suit, and thus, amounted to a frivolous claim.177
Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit used different approaches to determine whether or not an
Establishment Clause violation existed.178 The Fourth Circuit did not use a formal test to achieve its
constitutional analysis, but instead held that Establishment Clause inquiries are matters of degree,179
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basing their evaluation on the circumstances surrounding the legislative-led prayer.180 The Sixth Circuit,
on the other hand, held the Lemon test to be inapplicable to legislative-led prayer case.181 Instead, the
court applied both a “historical analysis” and coercion test to determine whether or not an Establishment
Clause violation existed.182 Consequently, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have issued conflicting opinions
interpreting the constitutionality of legislative-led prayers, creating a circuit split.183
V.

Impermissibility of Legislative-Led Prayer under Town of Greece, Marsh and Lemon
A.

Constitutionality Fails Under a “Historical Analysis”

Our nation’s history does not encompass prayers by legislators, and, as has been observed,
legislative-led prayer is different from clergy authorized prayers. 184 Although the Sixth Circuit argues
that legislative-led prayer is permissible under both a Marsh and Town of Greece analysis, the facts are
vastly distinguishable between the cases.185 There is a difference between extending prayers to
lawmakers, and limiting prayers solely to lawmakers.186 Also, there is not one authority that confirms
that Congress engaged in similar practices of legislative-led prayer.187 Although the Supreme Court has
cited instances of legislative-led prayer, none occurred before 1973, and is therefore not indicative of
contemporary practices.188 Accordingly, history is irrelevant to this analysis.
B. Constitutionality Fails Under a Coercion Test
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held in Lee v. Weisman held that instructing clergy to
give prayers that are nonsectarian constituted a means by which the government impermissibly “directed
and controlled the content of prayers.”189 Instruction of nonsectarian prayer was found impermissible
because it would force legislators and courts to censor prayer, generating even greater government
entanglement than the town’s current practice.190 Legislative-led prayer cases illustrate exactly that
excessive government entanglement.191 Justice Kennedy feared precisely these circumstances.192
Concluding that it would be a different story, if council members instructed the public to pray, shamed
anyone who refused to pray, or indicated that a members decisions might be contingent on whether they
pray or not.193 In both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the invocation practices were coercive in nature,
whereas in the Town of Greece, the government had not intentionally discriminated against nonChristians.194
C. Proposal to use Lemon test for Legislative-Led Prayers
If a law student were prompted by a professor to answer the question of whether legislative-led
prayer was constitutional, he or she would answer that it was unconstitutional, based upon a Lemon
analysis.195 The Establishment Clause’s fundamental objective is to ensure religious neutrality, in order
to respect the religious beliefs of all citizens.196 In Lemon, the Court held that the three main evils in
which the Establishment Clause was intended to protect are: “(1) sponsorship; (2) financial support;
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[and] (3) active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”197 Legislative-led prayer is in direct
violation with the first and third element. In both of these cases, local board members, who are apart of
the government, are not only sponsoring the advancement of certain religions but also are actively
involved in such religious activity.
Under the facts of both circuit court cases, Lemon is the most efficient test to use to ensure that
the Nations values are preserved. It is superior to the “historical approach” because it is better at
addressing the relevant values at stake. The “historical approach” places too much weight on the
founding fathers message of history, which often tends to be vague and inapplicable to a far more
diverse society.198 Indeed, we have no clear historical example of prayer being led by the legislators
themselves.
Both the coercion and endorsement test are used in specific circumstances.199 As seen in Lee v.
Weisman, the psychological coercion test is frequently used in the school context,200 whereas the
endorsement test is more appropriate to use when assessing the context of religious symbols, such as in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU.201 It is arguable that these tests could be used when reviewing
legislative-led prayers, but they are highly context-specific tests. Lemon provides a way to draw a line
between chaplain and clergy-led prayers on the one hand, and legislative-led prayer on the other.
Consequently, it is more appropriate to use the Lemon test in cases involving legislative-led prayer.
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The Lemon test best addresses these evils by requiring a court to determine if a States policy
survives constitutional scrutiny.202 In order to comply with the Establishment Clause, state action must
“(1) have secular legislative purpose; (2) the principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; [and] (3) the policy must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion,”203 Justice Kagan’s dissent in Town of Greece, focused on the towns
violation of religious equality.204 The town failed to recognize religious diversity, by never seeking to
“involve, accommodate, or in anyway reach out to adherents of non-Christian religions.”205 Justice
Kagan suggested ways in which the town could have employed religious equality, such as town council
members could have instructed Christian chaplains to give nonsectarian and generic prayers, or they
could have invited chaplains of minority religious groups to give the prayers.206 However, those
suggestions were never employed.207 Therefore, the towns practice was in direct violation with the
“First Amendment’s promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in her
government.”208 In both circuit court cases, there is no way to achieve religious equality, precisely
because the conduct lacks a secular purpose, advances religion as its primary effect, and excessively
entangles religion with government.209
In McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, the Supreme Court held that “a determination of the counties purpose
is a sound basis for ruling on the Establishment Clause complaints.”210 When the government’s purpose
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pre-eminently advances religion, it violates the Establishment Clauses fundamental values.211
Furthermore, the Court held that “examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation for every
American appellate court.”212 In an Establishment Clause analysis, examining purpose is imperative.213
The purpose of legislative-led prayer is pre-eminently religious rather than secular. However, the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits do not examine whether these legislative-led prayer policies have a secular
purpose. This is due to the fact that the historical test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test do not
require such an analysis.214 However, Lemon’s “purpose” requirement was specifically designed to
prohibit the government from abandoning neutrality, and the analysis is essential in protecting the rights
guaranteed under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 215
Neither the Fourth nor Sixth Circuits disagree that the effects of legislative-led prayer are clearly
religious.216 The heart of the disputes is whether or not the effects of legislative-led prayer are coercive
in nature.217 Thus, placing coercive strains upon religious minorities to adhere to the majorities’
religious beliefs’.218 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of prayer, as well as the
recognition that the Nation is made up of pluralistic people.219 However, the Court was explicit in
holding that any state action, that’s primary effect is to advance or inhibit one particular religion, is
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unconstitutional.220 In both instances, legislative-led prayers primary effect is to advance one religion
over another.221 Accordingly, legislative-led prayer should be deemed unconstitutional.
Lastly, the practice of legislative-led prayer leads to excessive entanglement between church and
state.222 In Marsh, the dissent held that “entanglement can take two forms.”223 In cases involving
legislative prayer, “the process of choosing a suitable chaplain, whether on a permanent or rotating
basis, and insuring that the chaplain limits himself or herself to suitable prayers involves the sort of
supervision . . . government should avoid.”224 If the dissent found legislative prayer to be considered
excessive entanglement, there is no doubt that the Court would find legislative-led prayer to be
excessive entanglement between church and state.225
In both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, board members are not only censoring prayers but also
delivering them, which creates excessive government entanglement.226 The need for impartiality and
accountability by local boards is essential for local governments to run smoothly. It is pertinent that
local board members, acting as government officials, remain neutral. Lemon takes into account the issue
of fusion of governmental and religious functions, when the church takes over state duties and, as here,
when the government engages in religious tasks.227 By allowing a state-paid chaplain and private clergy
to offer prayers, there is still a separation between church and state. However, when the legislators
themselves are offering prayer, they are participating in a religious task, rather than a government one.
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Lemon ensures for an across the board holding that these types of prayers have no secular
purpose, entangle the church and state by getting the state involved in religious functions and has a
primary effect of advancing religion. Accordingly, legislative-led prayer is incompatible with the
fundamental principles of the First Amendments Establishment Clause.
D. Conclusion
Due to the current circuit split,228 legislators and judges outside of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
may be apprehensive on how to approach the issue of legislative-led prayer. The Fourth Circuit follows
a fact sensitive analysis,229 acknowledging that the Supreme Court has yet to address legislative-led
prayer practice, whereas, the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, follows a “historical analysis” and finds
that legislative-led prayer is in fact consistent with the Court’s precedent.230 Further guidance from the
Supreme Court is necessary to determine whether legislative-led prayer policies are constitutional or
not.231 Addressing this question will provide much needed clarity to legislators and judges about what
the government is permitted to do. Until then, legislators and judges should proceed with caution.
Perhaps, local board members should resort to diversified prayers of local clergy or nonsectarian prayers
offered by a state-selected chaplain, which are neither coercive nor discriminatory in nature.
The Establishment Clause was established to protect individuals who are unwilling to conform to
legislative-led prayers.232 Therefore, the obvious next move for the Supreme Court is to grant certiorari
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and shed light on this issue. This can occur by ending the spirited split between the Circuits and holding
that legislative-led prayers are impermissible under the Establishment Clause.233
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